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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently assigned this case
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4) by Order dated
May 27, 2010. The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to
the Utah Supreme Court's assignment and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely
designation of fact and expert witnesses?
a. Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a
motion to strike under an abuse of discretion standard. Posner v. Equity
Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, f 23, 222 P.3d 775; Daniels v.
Gamma West Brachy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, \ 54, 221 P.3d 256.
b. Preservation of Issue: Defendant preserved this issue in its Motion to Strike
(R. at 372-73), Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike (R. at 374-77),
and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike (R. at 405-09).
Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment?
a. Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for review
conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial
court, but review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944
P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
2

b. Preservation of Issue: Defendant preserved this issue in its Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. at 288-89), Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (R. at 290-349), Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 378-85), and the trial court's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike (R. at 428-31).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(A)
A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under
Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2)(A)
If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a),
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for
appropriate sanctions.
The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure
in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(f)
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other
material as required by Rule 26(a) . . . that party shall not be
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take
any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises out of a motor vehicle collision between the parties that occurred
on or about July 18, 2003. Plaintiff claims to have sustained various injuries and
damages in the subject accident. Defendant claims that the accident was not his fault.
After several years of litigation and several scheduling orders, and after all discovery
deadlines had passed, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on
Plaintiffs failure to designate fact and expert witnesses. In response, Plaintiff filed
untimely designations of fact and expert witnesses, prompting Defendant to file a Motion
to Strike those untimely designations. The trial court granted the Motion to Strike and
the Motion for Summary Judgment, and this appeal ensued.
Facts and Procedural Details
On or about July 18, 2003 at a relatively short time past midnight, Plaintiff was
traveling northbound on 2300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, as a passenger in a vehicle
driven by Whitney Isaacson. (R. at 2.) At around the same time, Defendant was
operating a vehicle southbound on 2300 East. (R. at 2.) When both parties arrived at the
intersection of 2300 East and 3300 South, the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger
turned left (westward) in front of Defendant's vehicle, resulting in a collision. (R. at 2.)
As a result of this accident, Plaintiff claims to have sustained injuries to her neck,
back, right wrist, right foot, and experienced headaches and migraines. (R. at 292, 32122.) Plaintiff treated with approximately twelve different medical providers, including a
massage therapist, physical therapist, several medical doctors, a doctor of osteopathic
5

medicine, a chiropractor, and an acupuncturist. (R. at 293, 323-24.) Plaintiff also claims
to have required right wrist surgery, despite the fact that her first complaints of right wrist
pain occurred approximately seventeen months after the subject accident. (P.. at 293-94,
348.) However, causation of Plaintiff s medical complaints were complicated by a
previous motor vehicle accident (R. at 342) where she complained of pain to her neck,
low back, in between her shoulders, shoulders, arms, hands, hips, legs, knees, feet, and
chest, and also complained of headaches, dizziness, and nervousness/depression (R. at
345-46). Plaintiff had also hit her head on three separate occasions prior to the subject
accident which caused her to lose consciousness each time. (R. at 338.)
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter on or about September 22, 2005. (R. at
1-7.) On or about January 27, 2006, the trial court entered an Order approving the case
management order submitted by both parties. (R. at 22.) This Order required Plaintiff to
designate expert witnesses by May 24, 2006. (R. at 20.) Just days before this deadline,
by stipulation of the parties and Order of the court, the time was extended for Plaintiff to
designate expert witnesses until October 1, 2006. (R. at 36.) The parties subsequently
conducted depositions of the named parties and witnesses, the last of which occurred on
March 21, 2007. (R. at 114.) For the next twelve months, Defendant's counsel sent
Plaintiffs counsel four separate letters requesting the return of signed medical releases
from the Plaintiff so that Defendant could obtain the relevant medical records, and
Plaintiff failed to respond to each of these four letters. (R. at 114-15, 129-138.) In fact,
despite these several attempts, Defendant's counsel had absolutely no actual
communication or contact with Plaintiffs counsel for one year. (R. at 114-15.)
6

On February 27, 2008, the trial court scheduled an order to show cause hearing to
be held on April 30, 2008 to determine whether this case should be dismissed for failure
to prosecute. (R. at 103). Coincidentally, three weeks later on March 20, 2008,
Plaintiffs counsel finally contacted Defendant's counsel's office wishing to respond to
the request for medical releases. (R. at 115.) On that same day, Defendant's counsel
wrote a letter to Plaintiffs counsel in response and made the following statement: "I find
it troubling that it took the court's notice of the order to show cause to get you to respond
to our numerous attempts to proceed with discovery in this matter." (R. at 145.) Later
that same afternoon, counsel for the parties conducted a telephone conference to discuss
the medical releases and an independent medical examination. (R. at 116.) During that
conversation, Plaintiffs counsel stated that he wanted these issues resolved prior to "next
week's hearing." (Id.) Defense counsel then informed Plaintiffs counsel that the Order
to Show Cause hearing was not scheduled for "next week," but that it was scheduled for
"next month," referring to the April 30, 2008 hearing. (Id)
Despite the letter and the telephone conference, neither Plaintiff nor her counsel
appeared at the order to show cause hearing, prompting the trial court to dismiss the case
without prejudice. (R. at 163-64.) However, five and one-half months later, on October
16, 2008, the trial court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal based on the
finding that Plaintiffs counsel had suffered a life-threatening health condition which
precipitated events which led to the failure to docket the order to show cause hearing in
Plaintiffs counsel's calendaring system. (R. at 197-200.) In doing so, the trial court
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ordered: "Counsel and parties should govern themselves accordingly, and move this case
forward expeditiously without delay." (R. at 199.)
The trial court subsequently entered a new case management order which required
Plaintiff to designate expert witnesses by May 15, 2009 and fact witnesses by June 5,
2009. (R. at 205.) Once again, Plaintiff failed to designate any fact or expert witnesses,
and based on such failure, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on
September 14, 2009. (R. at 288-89.) One month later, in response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed her designation of fact and expert
witnesses. (R. at 359-60.) Defendant then filed a Motion to Strike the untimely
designations and supporting memoranda. (R. at 372-77, 405-09.) The trial court
subsequently granted Defendant's Motion to Strike, and because Plaintiff had no expert
witnesses to present at trial, granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based
on Plaintiffs inability to establish causation of her injuries or the reasonableness and
necessity of her medical treatment. (R. at 428-31.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely
designation of fact and expert witnesses. Plaintiff had three separate opportunities to
designate fact and expert witnesses, and failed to do so. Utah appellate courts have long
upheld trial court rulings excluding expert witnesses based on the presenting party's
failure to disclose such experts pursuant to rule 26(a)(3). A failure to disclose fact and
expert witnesses subjects an offending party to sanctions under rule 37(f), which prevents
8

a party from using a witness at any hearing unless the failure to disclose was harmless or
a party has good cause for the failure. Here, Plaintiffs failure to disclose resulted in
prejudice to Defendant by inhibiting his ability to defend against Plaintiffs claims based
on the close of discovery, the length of time that had elapsed since commencement of the
litigation, and the effect of the passage of time on witnesses' memories, and the loss of
the ability to obtain rebuttal experts and depose witnesses that had not been disclosed.
Additionally, Plaintiff offered no good cause for the failure to designate fact and expert
witnesses. Thus, the trial court was well within its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs
untimely designation of fact and expert witnesses.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to present any argument that supports her
contention that the trial court abused its broad discretion. Plaintiff erroneously claims
that Defendant failed to comply with rule 37(a)(2)(A) by not conferring with Plaintiff
prior to seeking a discovery sanction under rule 37(f). Defendant did not file a motion to
compel, and was therefore relieved of any requirement to confer with Plaintiff prior to
seeking an order striking the untimely witness designations. Secondly, the mere fact that
Defendant had obtained Plaintiffs medical records did not alleviate Plaintiff from
complying with rule 26(a)(3). Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its broad
discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely designation of fact and expert witnesses.
II
The trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
There are two primary bases supporting the trial court's decision. First, without expert
medical testimony, Plaintiff could not establish the element of causation of her
9

negligence claim. The injuries she complains of fall outside the common knowledge of a
layperson, requiring expert medical testimony. Plaintiff also has not established that her
experience as an EMT qualified her to do anything other than recognize and stabilize
traumatic injuries—qualifications that fall far short of the standard necessary to prove
causation. Even Dr. Chung's opinions would not have been available to Plaintiff because
there would have been no need to call Dr. Chung as a witness for the defense, and
Plaintiff did not designate Dr. Chung as her own expert.
Second, without expert testimony, Plaintiff could not establish the element of
damages of her negligence claim. Even if Plaintiff were somehow allowed to testify that
her claimed injuries arose from this accident, her training as an EMT would not have
qualified her to testify as to the reasonableness and necessity of her extensive medical
treatment, ranging from massage therapy to acupuncture, which also included a wrist
surgery. Plaintiff has presented no evidence of the reasonableness of these treatments.
Additionally, there are numerous factors which complicated Plaintiffs claim of damages,
including a prior motor vehicle accident which resulted in similar complaints, a gap in
treatment of approximately seventeen months related to Plaintiffs wrist surgery, and
other prior trauma that resulted in three separate occasions where Plaintiff lost
consciousness. These complicating factors would require a jury to speculate as to the
reasonableness and necessity of complex medical treatment. Therefore, the trial court
properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiffs failure
to establish her damages through admissible evidence.

10

ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN
STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S UNTIMELY DESIGNATION OF FACT AND
EXPERT WITNESSES,
It is well settled under Utah law that trial courts have broad discretion in the

management of cases before them. Preston & Chambers, B.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260,
262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291,
293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This broad discretion includes determining discovery
sanctions "because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery
process." Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., L.L.C, 2006 UT App
516, t 35, 154 P.3d 852 (quoting Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, \ 15, 999 P.2d
588). Additionally, pursuant to rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, trial courts
have broad discretion in "selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations. . . . "
Roller, 943 P.2d at 262 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 37 and Morton v. Continental Baking Co.,
938 P.2d 271, 273-75 (Utah 1997)).
In this case, Plaintiff had the opportunity to designate expert witnesses on three
separate occasions as ordered by the trial court—May 24, 2006, October 1, 2006, and
May 15, 2009—but failed to do so. (R. at 20, 36, and 205.) The Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure required Plaintiff to disclose expert witnesses, reports, substance of facts and
opinions, summary of grounds for each opinion, qualifications of the expert, a list of
publications authored by the expert within the last ten years, the compensation to be paid
for the testimony, and a listing of cases to which the expert previously testified. See Utah

n

R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). Rule 37 addresses the consequences of Plaintiff s failure and
states in pertinent part:
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other
material as required by Rule 26(a) . . . that party shall not be
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take
any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2).
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f).
Here, the trial court specifically found that Plaintiff had not provided 1he court
with any good or just cause for the failure to designate fact and expert witnesses by the
three previous deadlines. (R. at 429.) The trial court also found that Defendant was
prejudiced by Plaintiffs failure to designate any witnesses by not having the opportunity
to depose the untimely designated witnesses, by the long passage of time, and because
witnesses' memories fade over time, each of which impaired Defendant's ability to
defend against Plaintiffs claims. (R. at 430.) These findings were also made with an
understanding of the procedural history of this case.1 In light of these findings, the trial
court exercised its broad discretion and struck Plaintiffs untimely designation of fact and
expert witnesses. In response, Plaintiff argues two points: (A) that Defendant failed to
confer with Plaintiff prior to seeking sanctions under rule 37, and (B) that Defendant
already had records from Plaintiffs untimely designated expert, Hansen D.C.
(Appellant's Br. 12-14.) Each of these arguments lacks merit.
1

This case was previously dismissed based on Plaintiffs failure to appear at an order to show cause hearing
referenced in the "Facts" section of Appellee's Brief. Despite a letter from Defendant's counsel and a telephone
conference explaining that the trial court had scheduled the order to show cause hearing, the trial court exercised its
broad discretion in setting aside the dismissal of this case and giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.
12

A.

Plaintiff Erroneously Concludes That Defendant Was Required to
Comply With Rule 37(a)(2)(A) Prior to Filing a Motion to Strike.

Plaintiff cites to Rule 37(a)(2)(A) for the proposition that Defendant was required
to confer in good faith with Plaintiff prior to moving the trial court for an order striking
Plaintiffs untimely fact and expert witness designations. (Appellant's Br. 12-14.)
However, Rule 37(a)(2)(A) does not apply to this case. This rule states:
If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a),
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for
appropriate sanctions.
The motion must include a
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure
in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In this case, Defendant never filed a
motion to compel, and therefore did not have to meet the requirements of this rule. See
Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331,1 8, 170 P.3d 1138 ("[S]ubsection (f) of rule 37
is independent of the motion to compel procedure outlined in rule 37(a)."). Plaintiff
misconstrues the scope of rule 37(a)(2)(A) and asks this Court to improperly apply it to
Defendant's Motion to Strike.
Importantly, this Court has previously addressed and upheld trial court rulings
striking expert witnesses based on a party's failure to disclose such experts pursuant to
rule 26 as a discovery sanction without inquiry as to whether the parties conferred in
good faith. See Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, Tfij 13-14, 206 P.3d 302
(upholding trial court's ruling striking plaintiffs expert witness for failure to disclose
expert report); Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at \ 8 (recognizing a trial court's discretion
in excluding evidence or imposing sanctions under rule 37for failure to comply with rule
13

26(a)); Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303,fflf11,18, 141 P.3d 629 (holding that trial
court did not abuse its broad discretion in striking affidavit of expert who had not been
disclosed and had not provided a report). Indeed, "[tjhere is nothing in this provision
mandating that a motion to compel and subsequent court order granting such a motion be
prerequisites for the sanctions specified in rule 37(f)." Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at Tf
8. As in this case, "[Plaintiffs] attorney's failure to abide by the trial court's discovery
orders provide[s] ample grounds for the imposition of discovery sanctions." Id. This
Court should therefore disregard Plaintiffs claim that Defendant should have conferred
in good faith prior to seeking an order from the trial court striking Plaintiffs untimely
designation of fact and expert witnesses.
B.

Defendant's Receipt of Medical Records Does Not Alleviate Plaintiff
From Complying With the Requirements of Rule 26(a)(3).

Plaintiff also erroneously argues that the trial court erred in striking her untimely
designation of fact and expert witnesses because Defendant already had her medical
records. This argument appears to insinuate that Plaintiff had substantially complied with
rule 26(a)(3) and that perhaps Defendant suffered no prejudice by Plaintiffs failure to
submit formal designations of witnesses. In Pete v. Youngblood, this Court addressed a
similar argument and held the following:
Formal disclosure of experts is not pointless. Knowing the
identity of the opponent's expert witnesses allows a party to
properly prepare for trial The failure to disclose experts
prejudiced [defendant] because there are countermeasures
that could have been taken that are not applicable to fact
witnesses, such as attempting to disqualify the expert
testimony, retaining rebuttal experts, and holding additional
depositions to retrieve the information not available because
14

of the absence of a report. In sum, we agree with the district
court that even treating physicians and treating nurses must be
designated as experts if they are to provide expert testimony.
2006 UT App 303 at Tf 15 (emphasis in original). Without these designations, Defendant
did not know which witnesses should have been deposed. Consistent with this issue of
prejudice, the trial court ruled that "[w]ithout fact and expert designations, Defendant was
not required to depose all or even some of the individuals identified in Plaintiffs
discovery responses." (R. at 430.) Thus, having Plaintiffs medical records did not
alleviate Plaintiff from complying with rule 26(a)(3), and the trial court was well within
its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely fact and expert witness designations.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for
review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial court, but
review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997). Based on this standard of review, this Court should conclude that the trial
court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
In addressing Plaintiffs negligence claim, the trial court correctly noted that she
could only prevail if she first established a prima facie case of negligence, which requires
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a showing of causation and damages. Plaintiffs failure to designate any fact and expert
witnesses prevented her from establishing these two elements of her negligence claim,
requiring dismissal as a matter of law.
A.

Plaintiff Could Not Establish the Element of Causation in Her
Negligence Claim.

Under Utah law, a party must establish the element of causation in order to
recover on a claim for negligence. See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406,
Tj 21, 176 P.3d 446. "'[T]he causal connection between the alleged negligent act and the
injury is never presumed and this is a matter the plaintiff is always required to prove
affirmatively.'" Id. at U 21 (quoting Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1949)).
"Although 'the question of proximate causation is generally reserved for the jury, the trial
court may rule as a matter of law on this issue if there is no evidence to establish a causal
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation.'" Fox, 2007 UT App 406 at ^f 21
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
"In Utah, '[t]he need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link
between the defendant's negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of
the injury.'" Id. at Tf 22 (quoting Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, U 16, 12
P.3d 1015). Thus, "where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond
an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, there
must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury." Beard, 2000
UT App 285 at f 16. "In such cases, the 'testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need
for specific medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury.' It is only in
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'the most obvious cases5 that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using
expert testimony to prove causation." Fox, 2007 UT App 406 at \ 22 (quoting Beard,
2000UTApp285attl6).
1.

Plaintiffs Injury Claims Fall Outside the Common Knowledge
of Laypersons.

In the present case, Plaintiff complains of injuries which fall outside of the
common knowledge of laypersons, requiring expert medical testimony. In her
Complaint, Plaintiff claims to have suffered from permanent injuries, including injuries
to her neck, back, shoulders, and right wrist. (R. at 5.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff claims
that she suffered "permanent physical injuries and serious impairments of bodily
functions .. .." (Id.) Plaintiff also claims to have necessitated a wrist surgery as a result
of the subject accident. (R. at 321-22.) However, the evidence also shows that Plaintiff
had numerous accidents in which she suffered losses of consciousness prior to the subject
accident. Furthermore, Plaintiff was involved in a prior motor vehicle accident in which
she claimed injuries to her neck, low back, in between her shoulders, shoulders, arms,
hands, hips, legs, knees, feet, and chest, and also complained of headaches, dizziness, and
nervousness/depression. (R. at 345-46.) Further complicating matters was the fact that
Plaintiff first complained of wrist pain approximately seventeen months after the subject
accident, representing a considerable delay in treatment. (R. at 348.) These complicating
factors place this case outside the common knowledge of a layperson and into an area
requiring expert testimony. Fortunately, this Court has previously addressed similar
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situations and has held that expert testimony was necessary in order to establish the
element of causation.
In Fox, the plaintiff descended down some stairs in the Harman Building at
Brigham Young University when she slipped and was unable to use her right leg. Fox,
2007 UT App 406 at *{ 2. When the EMTs arrived, they observed that the plaintiffs right
knee was swollen and had deformities on both sides of her leg. Id. at ^ 4. While
assessing her, the plaintiff told the EMTs that "she felt her right knee go out as she was
going down[,]" "that she fell down only one stair, that she had been previously diagnosed
with osteoarthritis in her right knee, and that there was some missing cartilage in that
knee." Id. at \ 5. The trial court subsequently dismissed plaintiffs claim based on her
failure to provide expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of causation. Id. at \
14.
In upholding dismissal of plaintiff s claim, the Fox court stated that plaintiffs
claim "is not a case that is excepted from the requirement that a plaintiff use expert
testimony to establish a causal link between the defendant's negligent act and her injury."
Id. at \ 23. In support of this conclusion, the court explained that plaintiffs own
admission that her knee "gave out" and that she had a pre-existing condition of
osteoarthritis to her knee, "tied the cause of her fall to medical factors sufficiently
complicated to be beyond the ordinary senses and common experience of a layperson."
Id. Although the court recognized that the plaintiff "could testify that she descended the
stairway, fell, and experienced pain, she needed expert testimony to establish her prima
facie case of causation and to prevent the fact-finder from resorting to speculation." Id.
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Likewise, this Court addressed a similar situation in Hall v. Steimle, where it
dismissed the plaintiffs claim of negligence based on a failure to designate expert
witnesses to establish causation. 2009 WL 2569266 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2009)
(unpublished opinion). The plaintiff claimed that his injuries were different than the
injuries complained of in Fox, and that they involved "medical damages within the
common experience of a layperson such that expert witness testimony is not required to
establish causation." Id. at * 1. In responding to this argument, the court stated:
[Plaintiffs] negligence suit, while presenting different
injuries and causation issues than those in Fox and Beard, is
still not an obvious case. [Plaintiffs] negligence case is
complicated by a previous diving injury in the summer of
1998 or 1999 when [he] suffered whiplash because he dove
into a shallow lake. On October 4, 2000, about two months
before the motor vehicle accident, [plaintiff] presented to
Anderson Chiropractic complaining of neck and back pain.
In his complaint, [plaintiff] alleges that he suffered permanent
neck and back injuries as a result of the motor vehicle
accident. It is beyond the ordinary knowledge and common
experience of a layperson, given the history of [plaintiffs]
neck and back pain, to determine whether the diving incident
or the motor vehicle accident caused [plaintiffs] neck and
back injuries, permanent or otherwise.
[A] jury would not, without resorting to speculation, be able
to determine if [plaintiffs] neck and back pain was caused by
the motor vehicle accident or the diving incident, or if the
motor vehicle accident exacerbated a pre-existing condition.
Testimony concerning a chronological relationship between
the accident and [plaintiffs] neck and back pain is not
sufficient, in this case, to establish causation.
(Id.) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
Thus, like in Hall, a jury would have to speculate as to whether Plaintiffs neck
and back pain were a result of the subject accident, or one of her many prior accidents. A
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jury would also have to speculate as to whether Plaintiff may have suffered any
permanent injury or whether she suffered an exacerbation of a pre-existing injury, issues
outside the common knowledge of laypersons. Therefore, without any medical expert to
establish causation of Plaintiff s complicated injury claims, Plaintiff cannot establish the
element of causation, requiring this Court to uphold the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.
2.

Plaintiff Cannot Establish the Element of Causation Based on
Her Own Testimony as an EMT or Dr. Chung's Testimony.

Plaintiff argues that even if her untimely designated expert were not allowed to
testify, that she could have established the element of causation based on her training as
an EMT or based on Dr. Chung's testimony. (Appellant's Br. 7.) These arguments lack
merit. First, Plaintiff could only establish that she felt pain as a result of the accident,
limiting her testimony to a chronological association between the accident and her pain
complaints. The only evidence submitted by Plaintiff as to her qualifications is a single
sentence in her affidavit which states: "8. I was a licensed Utah Emergency Medical
Technician and was trained to recognize and stabilize traumatic injuries resulting from
motor vehicle collisions and other violent impacts." (R. at 369.) Based on this statement
alone, Plaintiff could not have established that the treatment she received falling outside
the areas of recognition and stabilization were caused by this accident. Nor is there any
evidence that her training as an EMT provided her with sufficient knowledge to
determine which treatments would have been appropriate or which treatments were
associated with pre-existing conditions. In short, there is no evidence to suggest that
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Plaintiffs training as an EMT was sufficient to replace that of a medical doctor or other
qualified treating physician.
Second, Plaintiff could not have relied on Dr. Chung's testimony because she did
not timely designate Dr. Chung as an expert to support her claim. Without any experts to
testify on Plaintiffs behalf, Defendant would not have called Dr. Chung as a witness
because there would not have been any expert evidence for him to rebut. In short,
Plaintiff should not have relied on Defendant to establish her own negligence claim.
More importantly, without any expert to establish causation, Plaintiff could not have, and
should not have, reached trial based on her inability to establish a prima facie claim for
negligence. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs negligence claim as a
matter of law.
B.

Plaintiff Could Not Establish the Element of Damages in Her
Negligence Claim.

In order to prevail on a negligence claim, a party must establish damages. Asael
Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315,128, 193 P.3d 650. In addition
to an inability to establish causation in this case, Plaintiff also cannot establish her
damages without expert medical testimony, supporting the trial court's grant of summary
judgment.
In Beard v. K-mart Corp., this Court was asked to determine whether the trial
court erred in allowing the jury to consider three surgeries that plaintiff had in relation to
an accident where she was accidentally hit in the head by an employee who was
attempting to start a lawn mower. 2000 UT App 285 at ^ 2-3. The plaintiff failed to
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establish any expert testimony as to whether her surgeries were necessitated by the
accident, instead claiming that such necessity could be assumed based on her testimony
of the chronological association between her pain complaints and the accident. Id. at fflf
12, 15-16. The court responded:
In this case, the question is not whether the accident at KMart caused Beard injury, but rather whether injuries
sustained as a result of the accident at K-Mart required the
neurological surgeries performed on Beard's neck and wrists.
Beard was properly permitted to testify that the accident in
the store caused pain and injury. The question as to whether
such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within the
common knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and
could properly be submitted to the jury. What is missing in
the evidence, however, is the link between the injuries
suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. . . . Certainly
whether the need for complex neurological surgery was a
result of the accident at K-Mart is not within the common
experience of laypersons.
Id. at ^116 (emphasis added).
Here, the Plaintiff could testify regarding the pain she experienced after the
subject accident as this evidence is certainly within the common knowledge and
experience of laypersons. However, as in Beard, Plaintiff could not establish the
necessity of her wrist surgery because the need for surgery falls outside the common
knowledge of laypersons.

Thus, "[w]ithout the required expert medical opinion linking

the injury to the necessity of the surgery, a jury would simply be speculating about a
linkage that is beyond its knowledge and experience. The expert medical testimony
merely established a chronological relationship between the accident and [plaintiffs]
symptoms." Id. at ^20.
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In addition to an inability to establish the necessity of her wrist surgery, Plaintiff
also cannot establish the reasonableness and necessity of the numerous amounts and
types of medical treatments she received. Plaintiff has not established through any
evidence that her own experience as an EMT qualifies her to determine the
reasonableness and necessity of physical therapy, chiropractic therapy, massage therapy,
and acupuncture based on her pain complaints. Perhaps more importantly, Plaintiff
cannot even establish that the amounts she was charged were reasonable.
In short, Plaintiff cannot establish that the treatment she received was reasonable,
necessary, and related to the subject accident, and therefore cannot establish her damages.
Laypersons' common knowledge does not entail an understanding of any of these
treatment modalities, whether the different modalities should be experienced
concurrently, how many treatments are reasonable, whether the amounts charged are
reasonable, whether any diagnostic studies are reasonable or necessary, or whether any
surgery was necessitated by the subject accident as opposed to any pre-existing condition.
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish damages, entitling Defendant to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs untimely
designation of fact and expert witnesses and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court used its broad discretion in determining that Plaintiff could not designate
fact and expert witnesses long after the scheduling order deadline had passed, and even
after having three separate opportunities to do so. The record shows that the trial court
had previously used its broad discretion in allowing Plaintiff to set aside the prior
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dismissal of this case, even when the evidence showed that Plaintiffs counsel did in fact
have knowledge of the order to show cause hearing. The trial court's decision was also
based on the finding that Plaintiffs failure was not harmless in that it prejudiced
Defendant's ability to defend against Plaintiffs claims and that Plaintiff had not provided
any good cause for her failure to timely designate fact and expert witnesses. Thus, the
trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely witness
designations.
The trial court also properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
based on Plaintiffs inability to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Specifically,
without expert medical testimony, Plaintiff could not establish causation or damages in
her case. Even if Plaintiff were allowed to establish a chronological association between
the accident and her injuries, a jury would have to speculate as to whether the extensive
treatments she received were reasonable, necessary, and related to this subject accident,
and not to pre-existing conditions and prior accidents. The nature of these various
treatments, along with their complicating factors, takes this case out of the common
knowledge of laypersons. Thus, the trial court correctly granted Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
ADDENDUM
Defendant has attached as an addendum the case of Hall v. Steimle, an
unpublished opinion, for the Court's convenience.
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Before Judges GREENWOOD, THORNE, and
McHUGH.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge:
*1 Jonathan Hall appeals from the district
court's order granting summary judgment in favor
of Jason Steimle and dismissing Hall's negligence
claim with prejudice based on Hall's failure to designate an expert witness on causation. We affirm.
In a negligence claim, the plaintiff carries the
burden of establishing a prima facie case, including
proximate and actual causation of the injury. See
Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, %
21, 176 P.3d 446. "[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Crestwood Cove
Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, H 10,
164 P.3d 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we
review the district court's conclusions of law for
correctness and give them no deference. See Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, % 5,
173 P.3d 166; Blackner v. State, Dep't of Tramp.,
2002 UT 44,11 8, 48 P.3d 949.
Hall asserts that the district court erred in determining that Hall failed to establish a prima facie
case of causation by not designating an expert witness. Hall argues that his injuries, unlike those in
Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App
406, 176 P,3d 446, and Beard v. K-Mart Corp.,
2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015, involve medical
damages within the common experience of a
layperson such that expert witness testimony is not
required to establish causation. Indeed, " '[t]he
need for positive expert testimony to establish a
causal link between the defendants' negligent act
and the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of
the injury.' " Fox, 2007 UT App 406, «1| 22, 176
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P 3d 446 (alteration in original) (quoting Beard
2000 UT App 285, \ 16, 12 P 3d 1015) However,
"[i]t is only m 'the most obvious cases' that a
plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of
using expert testimony to prove causation" Id
(quoting Beard 2000 UT App 285, \ 16, 12 P 3d
101S)
Hall's negligence suit, while presenting different injuries and causation issues than those in Fox
FN1
and Beard
is still not an obvious case Rather,
Hall's negligence case is complicated by a previous
diving injury m the summer of 1998 or 1999 when
Hall suffered whiplash because he dove into a shallow lake On October 4, 2000, about two months
before the motor vehicle accident, Hall presented to
Anderson Chiropractic complaining of neck and
back pain In his complaint, Hail alleges that he
suffered permanent neck and back injuries as a result of the motor vehicle accident It is beyond the
ordinary knowledge and common experience of a
layperson, given the history of Hall's neck and back
pain, to determine whether the diving incident or
the motor vehicle accident caused Hall's neck and
back injuries, permanent or otherwise
FN1 The plaintiff in Fox ^ Bngham
Young UmversiK 2007 UT App 406, 176
P 3d 446, broke her leg after a slip and fall
See id % 6 This court affirmed the trial
court's ruling that expert testimony was required to determine whether the need for
her medical treatment was caused by the
allegedly defective stairs or the plaintiffs
own arthritic knee See id ffl[ 23-25
The plaintiff in Beard I K-Mart Coip
2000 UT App 285, 12 P 3d 1015,
suffered neck and wrist problems after
being struck in the head and falling to
the floor See id \ 2 This court determined that without expert medical opinion
linking the injury to the necessity of the
surgery, a jury would be speculating
about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge and experience See id K 20
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Although Dr Anderson, Hall's treating chiropractor, was designated to testify concerning any
observable changes to Hall's neck and back condition before and after the motor vehicle accident, a
jury would not, without resorting to speculation, be
able to determine if Hall's neck and back pain was
caused by the motor vehicle accident or the diving
incident, or if the motor vehicle ace ident exacerbated a pre-existing condition Testimony concerning a chronological relationship between the accident and Hall's neck and back pain is not sufficient,
in this case, to establish causation
See Beard
2000 U1 App 285,H 20, 12 P 3d 1015 (determining
that the trial court erred in failing to remove the issue of causation from the jury, stating that "expert
medical testimony merely established a chronological relationship between the accident and [the
plaintiffs] symptoms No expert medical testimony
was received that the neck and wrist surgeries were
necessitated by her accident")
FN2 Hall also asserts that a genuine issue
of material fact precludes summary judgment Hall argues that there are factual disputes as to when Hall began experiencing
pain following the motor vehicle accident
and as to the location, type, and seventy of
the pain experienced after the accident
Such disputes, however, do not establish
causation in this case in the absence of expert testimony
*2 The district court did not err in dismissing
Hall's negligence claim for failure to present expert
testimony on the element of causation because the
circumstances and nature of Hall's neck and back
injuries were sufficiently complex to require such
testimony As a result, we affirm the district court's
summary judgment ruling in favor of Steimle
WE CONCUR PAMELA T GREENWOOD,
Presiding Judge and CAROLYN B McIIUGH,
Judge
Utah App ,2009
Hallv Steimle
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